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REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS IN WASHINGTON
BIRNEY N. DEMPCY*
In 1960 Congress adopted §§ 856-858 of the Internal Revenue Code'
with the avowed purpose of granting to the small investor in real estate
the same federal income tax advantages that are afforded investors in
regulated investment companies.2 However the tax advantages that are
granted have not given rise to a general adoption of organizations
which qualify for the tax advantages.3 The major reasons for this lack
of interest are the complexity of the sections themselves, problems
raised by the regulations (many of which have been rectified by the
final regulations which were adopted April 28, 1962), and problems
raised by state law.
This article will discuss the Real Estate Investment Trust4 with em-
phasis on Washington law, and will not discuss the problems of qualifi-
cation under §§ 856-858 of the Internal Revenue Code since this sub-
ject has been covered by several articles.'
The Internal Revenue Code provides basically that an unincorpo-
rated trust or association with 100 or more shareholders, which other-
wise would be taxable as a corporation, may elect to be exempt from
federal corporate income tax to the extent that income is distributed to
shareholders, provided that the following qualifications are met:
1. Ninety percent or more of taxable income is so distributed.
2. At least ninety percent of gross income is from dividends, interest,
rents from real property, gain from the sale of stock or securities
and real property, and refunds of real estate taxes.
3. At least seventy-five percent of gross income is from rents from
* Associate, Clodfelter & Bowden, Seattle, Washington.
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 856-58.2 HOUSE VAYS AND MEANS COmm. 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON H.R. 12559
(Comm. print 1960).
3 At the time of the adoption of the final regulations, 52 trusts had filed registration
statements with the SEC. Of these, 27 had been cleared. 4 P.H. FED. TAx SmEv. 11 32,
266.
4 The Real Estate Investment Trust is referred to herein as REIT.
5 Roberts, 71Te Real Estate Investment Trust-New Tax Savings Opportunities for
Investors, 1961 So. CALIF. TAX INST. 27 (1961). Walder, Real Estate Investment
Trusts, 39 TAXES 664 (1961) ; 7 CCH 1962 STAND. FEm. TAx REP. ff 8725.
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real property, mortgage interest, or gain from sale of real prop-
erty. Rents from real property do not include rent which the
REIT earns from active participation in the management of prop-
erties or rents received from certain related tenants.
4. Less than thirty percent of gross income is from sales of stock or
securities held for less than six months and real property held for
less than four years.
5. At the end of each quarter at least seventy-five percent of the
value of total assets is represented by "real estate assets," cash,
cash items and government securities.
If these and other qualifications are met, then the trust escapes tax
on income which it distributes to its shareholders, and the shareholders
are taxed at ordinary or capital gains rates, depending upon the char-
acter of the income in the hands of the trust. No dividend received
credit is allowed to shareholders. It should be noticed that in addition
to satisfying the qualification sections of the Code, in order to get the
tax advantages provided, the trust must make an election to be so taxed
and must comply with information requirements of the regulations.'
ORGANIZATION OF REIT
In its usual form the REIT will be organized by having the title to
property taken by one or more trustees. The trustee may wish to con-
tract with an advisory organization experienced in real estate invest-
ments. The advisory organization will search for and suggest pur-
chases to the trustee. Since the trust itself cannot actively engage in
the management of real property without risking disqualification," the
trust must lease all of its property to management organizations or
operate through an independent contractor. If the promoters of the
trust are interested in receiving some return for their organizational
efforts, this return may be realized either through an interest in the
advisory or management organizations, or through ownership of shares
of the trust. However, common ownership between the management
company and the trust is limited by the Internal Revenue Service regu-
lations.'
6 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 857(a) (2) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.857-6; 1.857-7 (1962).
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d) (3) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4. (1962).
8 INT. R,_v. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.8564 (1962).
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TYPES OF REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
The three basic types of REIT are "blank check trusts," ".swap
trusts" and "mortgage trusts."
Blank Check Trust
The "blank check trust" is one which sells its stock to the public
without owning any property. The proceeds received from the public
offering are used to purchase properties selected by the trustee. At the
time of the public offering the trustee may indicate in the prospectus
the properties he intends to purchase. However, unless the property is
under option, the intentions expressed by the trustee and the disclosure
of the terms he intends to offer may make it difficult to acquire the
property on the most favorable terms.
Since a blank check trust will have no past earnings record or prop-
erties with which to interest the investing public, it may be difficult to
sell shares of this type of trust unless the public has a good deal of faith
in the trustee and advisers.
Swap Trust
The trustee of the "swap trust" attempts to exchange shares of the
trust for property. There are several reasons why such an exchange
could be advantageous to a property owner. The pooling of many
properties by different property owners provides diversification of risk
and the opportunity for the property owner to relieve himself of the
obligations of management by transferring management to a centralized
management firm.
Another possible advantage of the swap trust is liquidity. Whether
this advantage will result depends on whether the trust's shares are
freely transferable in a public market. If a market for the stock does
exist, a property owner can achieve liquidity by exchanging his property
for stock and leasing the property back if he desires to continue its
operation. The property owner has exchanged an asset which may be
difficult to liquidate for one that can be turned into cash in a few days
with considerably less selling expenses. It may be possible for the trust
to refinance the mortgage obligations on all properties exchanged at less
than cost by negotiating one large mortgage loan secured by all proper-
ties and in this way achieve a smaller interest rate and a larger return
for the property owners.
A major problem of the swap trust is whether or not to attempt to
1962]
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escape the provisions of § 351 of the Internal Revenue Code.9 Section
351 requires a tax free exchange if shareholders exchange property for
stock and immediately after the exchange own eighty percent or more
of the stock of the trust. If the trust wants a tax free exchange it will
attempt to show that the different property owners who are exchanging
properties at different times are part of one group and are classified as
persons who control eighty percent or more of the stock of the trust.
In order to avoid any argument with the Internal Revenue Service, the
trust may escrow the properties and when the desired number of prop-
erty owners has been located, exchange all properties in one transaction.
If a tax free exchange is not desired the trust will want to show that
each exchange is an isolated transaction and the particular shareholder
involved in any one exchange did not have eighty percent control of the
trust after the exchange. Although this may work with later exchanges,
at least the first exchange will have to be tax free if there are no other
shareholders at that time, since after the first exchange the first share-
holder will have one hundred percent control.
The choice between a tax free exchange and a taxable exchange is
not an easy one. If the exchange is tax free no tax will have to be paid
by the shareholder, and the trust will take the cost basis for tax pur-
poses that the shareholder had and its depreciation will be determined
by that cost basis. 10 Since the amount of taxable income is dependent
upon depreciation, the transfer of properties of equal value but differing
cost bases will cause inequities among shareholders. On the other hand,
if the exchange is taxable the trust will get a stepped-up cost basis but
the shareholders will be required to pay tax upon the difference between
the market value of the shares taken and the cost basis of the property
exchanged. 1 Since the shareholder may not receive any cash from the
exchange with which to pay the tax, he may not wish to enter the
transaction.
Mortgage Trust
A mortgage trust is one which primarily holds mortgages rather than
real property. Although mortgage trusts have been formed their desira-
bility has been limited by the regulations adopted by many states. In
California, for instance, a mortgage trust cannot lend more than sixty-
six and two-thirds percent of the market value of any property.2
0 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 351.
10 INT. RzV. CODE OF 1954, § 362(a).
11 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1001.
12 10 CAL. An.. CODE, § 552(b).
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Mortgage trusts appear to be less advantageous than alternative forms
or organizations, which grant mortgages, such as savings and loan asso-
ciations.13
OPEN END REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRuSTS
Open end trusts are those which stand ready to redeem their own
shares, and any of the three types of trusts listed above can organize on
an open end basis. Although this is a common practice among mutual
funds, REITs have encountered much opposition. The Midwest"' and
the California'3 regulations prohibit them. The SEC has proposed a
ruling which would prohibit registration of an open end REIT which
had most of its assets invested in property other than cash or securities
with a readily determinable market value." There are two major ob-
jections to open end trusts. The first is the lack of liquidity necessary
to redeem more than a small number of shares unless the trust is holding
large cash reserves. A mutual fund which invests in securities can con-
vert to cash quickly even though fully invested, while a REIT cannot
liquidate real estate quickly. The second objection is that a REIT
cannot readily determine daily property values with sufficient precision
to calculate the value of shares to be redeemed."
THE REIT iN WASHiNGTON
The major problem under Washington law is whether the so-called
Massachusetts Trust, which is the form of business organization most
conducive to the operation of a real estate business qualifying for the
federal tax advantages," can legally do business in the State of Wash-
ington. Although in 1959 the Washington legislature adopted the
Massachusetts Trust Act 9 the Department of Licenses of the State of
Washington has taken the position that it will not allow securities of a
13 See comparison between REIT and savings and loan associations in Note, Real
Estate Investment Trusts-Equalization of Investment Opportunity or Unjustified Tax
Break to Favored Interests, 1961 WAsH. U.L.Q. 436.
24 See Statement of Policy of the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association
reproduced in 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. Rn,. 4753-55.
5 10 CA. ADm. CoDE§ 552(i).
16 Wall Street Journal, Aug. 14, 1962, p. 2.
17 For a discussion of SEC problems of the REIT see Wheat & Armstrong, Regulda-
tion of Securities of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 16 Bus. LAW 919 (1960).Is The final regulations allow business organizations other than Massachusetts Trusts
to qualify as REIT, and therefore allow associations, general partnerships and limited
partnerships. Since limited liability is of great importance to the passive investor, it is
presumed that only the limited partnership will be used in place of the Massachusetts
Trust. However, since the adoption of the new Kintner Regulations, Treas. Reg. §
301.7701 (1960), there will be no tax advantage for a limited partnership to qualify as a
REIT.
19 RCW 23.90.
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Massachusetts Trust to be offered to the public in Washington until the
constitutionality of the Massachusetts Trust Act is established. Since
a REIT must have one hundred or more shareholders, the blessing of
the Department of Licenses is essential."
The concern of the Department of Licenses arises from two Washing-
ton cases decided in the 1920's: State ex rel. Range v. Hinkle2 and
State ex rel. Colvin v. Paine.2 In both of these cases foreign common
law business trusts were attempting to do business in Washington with-
out paying corporate fees. To reach the end result that common law
business trusts should not be allowed to do business in the same manner
as corporations without being subject to laws governing corporations,
the court in both cases held that common law business trusts are pro-
hibited from doing business in this state, and are "without legal stand-
ing" in Washington courts.2
Although the evil which the court was attempting to cure is no longer
present, because the 1959 Massachusetts Trust Act specifically provides
that Massachusetts Trusts must pay all corporate fees24 and are subject
to "applicable rights and duties existing under common law and statutes
of this state in a manner similar to those applicable to domestic and
foreign corporations,"2 the language of the Range and Colvin cases
remains to haunt the REIT 6
In order to determine the constitutionality of the Massachusetts
Trust in light of these cases, an action was filed in King County Supe-
rior Court by the Pacific American Realty Trust against the Depart-
ment of Licenses to compel the Department to issue a permit allowing
the Trust to offer its securities in the State of Washington.Y On cross
motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court of King County
20 RCW 2120.320.
21126 Wash. 581, 219 Pac. 41 (1923).
22 137 Wash. 566, 243 Pac. 2 (1926).
23 State ex rel. Range v. Hinkle, supra note 21.
24 RCW 23.90.040(3).
25 RCW 23.90.040 (4). (Emphasis added.)
26 Another problem raised by the 1959 Massachusetts Trust Act is whether applica-
ble corporation laws to which a trust is subject disqualify the trust for the federal
tax benefit. The proposed regulations (Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(d) (1)), provided
that the trustee must be free from control of shareholders other than the right to elect
trustees. The Washington corporation statutes contain provisions granting powers to
shareholders, thus raising a question of whether a Washington trust could qualify for
the federal tax benefits (see discussion 16 Bus. Law 900, 902 (1960). Although the final
regulations require that the trustee must have "continuing exclusive control" over the
management of the trust and trust property and the disposition of trust property (Treas.
Reg. § 1.856-1 (d) (1)), the requirement that he be free of shareholder control has been
deleted (see discussion in Post and King, Final REIT Regrlations Adopted, J. TAXA-
TION, July, 1962, p. 54.27King County Superior Court Cause No. 586968 (July 13, 1962).
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held that a Massachusetts Trust form of business organization is not
illegal in Washington where it complies with laws relating to corpora-
tions. As will be discussed later in this article, the Superior Court
decision is questionable if it implies that a Massachusetts Trust must
comply with all statutory corporation laws in order to be constitutional.
This case is presently on appeal to the Supreme Court of Washington.
It must be kept in mind that the Pacific American Realty Trust is a
trust formed under the laws of Massachusetts which is attempting to
sell securities in Washington and therefore no issue is before the court
as to whether such a trust can be created under the laws of Washington.
The Trust is merely attempting to sell its securities in this state.
The argument of the Range and Colvin cases is that the Massachu-
setts Trust violates Article 12 § 5 of the Washington constitution,
which reads as follows:
The term corporations, as used in this article, shall be construed to
include *ll associations and joint stock companies having any powers
or privileges of corporations not possessed by individuals or partner-
ships, and all corporations shall have the right to sue and shall be sub-
ject to be sued, in all courts, in like cases as natural persons. (Empha-
sis added.)
The court said in the Range case:
It would seem that the framers of our constitution... wisely provided
that the term 'corporations' should include 'all associations and join
[sic] stock companies having any powers or privileges of corporations
not possessed by individuals or partnerships' and thereby prevented the
formation of self-organized associations of every kind for the purpose
of transacting business without meeting the obligations and complying
with the statutory regulations of corporations.2
The Department of Licenses takes the position in the Pacific Ameri-
can Realty Trust case that a Massachusetts Trust is a corporation
within the definition of Article 12 § 5 because it has powers and privi-
leges of corporations not possessed by individuals and partnerships, and
therefore it must comply with all laws pertaining to corporations and
must be formed under laws pertaining to corporations. The Depart-
ment of Licenses argues that the import of the language quoted above
in the Range case and the constitution is that only corporations, part-
nerships and individual proprietorships can conduct business in Wash-
ington, and that a form of business organization which is not a proprie-
torship or partnership must comply with the general laws relating to
28 126 Wash. 581, 587, 219 Pac. 41, 43 (1923).
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corporations. The Department further argues that the 1959 Massa-
chusetts Trust Act does not require that Massachusetts Trusts comply
with all general corporation laws, and therefore such trusts are invalid.
The Pacific American Realty Trust argues in its memorandum filed
in Superior Court that the Range and Colvin cases hold that Massachu-
setts Trusts are corporations within the meaning of Article 12 § 5 and
therefore are a valid form of business organization only if they comply
with laws relating to corporations. It is argued further that the 1959
Massachusetts Trust Act requires a Massachusetts Trust to comply
with the laws applying to corporations, and therefore the objections of
the Range and Colvin cases have been satisfied.
Although it is understandable that Pacific American Realty Trust
would want to support its argument with an analysis which does not
require the court to overrule prior decisions, there is still a good deal of
language in those cases which supports the argument of the Department
of Licenses, if those cases are correctly decided. In addition, the 1959
Massachusetts Trust Act itself is not clear as to whether a Massachu-
setts Trust must comply with all laws pertaining to corporations. The
Act, after listing specific laws applying to corporations with which the
trust must comply, states that the trust is subject to other ".... applica-
ble rights and duties existing under common law and statutes of this
state in a manner similar to ... corporations.""8 (Emphasis added.)
There appears, therefore, to be some question as to whether the statute
requires trusts to comply with all corporate laws.
However, even though the Department of Licenses finds some sup-
port in the Range and Colvin cases it appears that these cases do not
properly interpret the constitution and it is difficult to find support in
the constitution for the propositions that only corporations (as defined
in statutory law), partnerships and individuals can organize to do busi-
ness in Washington, and that organizations other than partnerships and
individuals must comply with all general laws applying to "corpora-
tions."
Many other states have a constitutional provision identical or similar
to that of Article 12 § 5 of the Washington Constitution"0 and although
29 RCW 23.90.040.
30 AL. CONST. art. 13, § 13; Aaiz. CONST. art 14, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. 12, § 4;
IDAHO CONST. art. 11, § 16; KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 6; Ky. CONST. § 208; MICE. CONST.
art. 11, § 15; MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 10; Miss. CoNST. art. 7, § 199; Mo. CoNsT. art 11,
§ 1; MONT. CONST. art. 15, § 13; N.Y. CONST. art. 10, § 4; N.C. CONST. art. 8, § 3; N.D.
CoNsT. art 7, § 144; PA. CONST. art 16, § 13; S.C. CoNsT. art. 9, § 2; S.D. CoNsT. art.
17, § 19; VA. CoNsT. art 12, § 1.
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some states follow the rule adopted by the Washington courts' other
states have not come to the same conclusion. 2
The two basic errors in the reasoning in the Range case are: (1) the
court infers that individuals by contract can give themselves the powers
and privileges of corporations, and (2) the court's conclusion that the
definition of the word "corporations" contained in Article 12 § 5 was
meant to be a general definition of the word "corporations" for all
purposes.
The court in the Range case supports its conclusion that the Massa-
chusetts Trust is a corporation by reciting several provisions of the
trust instrument which purport to give the beneficiaries of the trust
powers and privileges of corporations. For example, the trust instru-
ment provided that the beneficiaries and trustees had limited liability.
The court reasoned that since individuals and partnerships do not have
limited liability (and other powers and privileges listed), the Massa-
chusetts Trust had powers and privileges of corporations not possessed
by individuals and partnerships. The fallacy of this reasoning is appar-
ent because individuals and partnerships cannot give themselves limited
liability as to the public in general by contracting among themselves;
only the sovereign state can do this." The trust can limit its liability to
an extent by contracting with third persons, but so can individuals and
partnerships. Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that indi-
viduals cannot confer upon themselves the powers and privileges of
corporations.3
31 Reilly v. Clyne, 27 Ariz. 432, 234 Pac. 35 (1925); Old River Farms Co. v.
Haegelin, 207 Colo. 290, 276 P2d 1047 (1929); State v. United Royalty Co., 188
Kan. 443, 363 P.2d 397 (1961) ; Fitch v. United Royalty Co., 143 Kan. 486, 55 P.2d
409 (1936); Weber Engine Co. v. Alter, 120 Kan. 557, 245 Pac. 143 (1926); Home
Lumber Co. v. State Charter Board, 107 Kan. 153, 190 Pac. 601 (1920). In the Reilly
case the statutory definition of corporation was the same as the constitutional definition
which is not the case in Washington, and therefore the case does not necessarily sup-
port the position of the Washington court. There is no question that the state legisla-
ture can require a Massachusetts Trust to comply with the statutory corporation laws.
The question is whether a constitutional provision similar to Article 12 § 5 of the
Washington Constitution requires a Massachusetts Trust to conform to statutory law.
See also American Ry. Express v. Asher, 218 Ky. 172, 291 S.W. 21 (1927).
32 Broci v. American Express Co., 279 F.2d 785 (6th Cir. 1960) ; State v. Cos-
grove, 36 Idaho 278, 210 Pac. 393 (1922); Spotswood v. Morris, 12 Idaho 360, 85
Pac. 1094 (1906); Michigan Trust v. Herpolsheimer, 256 Mich. 589, 240 N.W. 6
(1932); Attorney General v. McVichie, 138 Mich. 387, 101 N.W. 552 (1904) ;Forest
City Mfg. Co. v. ILGW, Local No. 104, 233 Mo. 935, 111 S.W.2d 934 (1938); Hodg-
kiss v. Northland Petroleum Consol., 104 Mont. 328, 67 P.2d 811 (1937); Gifford v.
Fargo, 176 N.Y. Supp. 568 (Sup. Ct. 1919) ; Strawberry Hill Land Corp. v Starbuck,
124 Va. 71, 97 S.E. 362 (1918).
33 "A common law trust is not a corporation. It is based upon voluntary action of
individuals." Michigan Trust v. Herpolsheimer, 256 Mich. 589, 240 N.W. 6, 9 (1932).
34 In Spotswood v. Morris, 12 Idaho 360, 85 Pac. 1094, 1099 (1906), the court said in
holding that a constitutional provision identical to that of Washington did not prohibit
1962]
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Since only the sovereign can grant powers and privileges of corpora-
tions, Article 12 § 5 of the Washington Constitution can apply only to
joint stock companies and associations which have been granted such
powers by the State,3" and at the time of the Range and Colvin cases
Washington had not granted any powers and privileges of corporations
to Massachusetts Trusts.
If a joint stock company or association is not granted powers or privi-
leges of a corporation under local law, does the fact that it is granted
such powers by a foreign sovereign cause it to come within the constitu-
tion provision? The only case found which discussed this point directly
was Forest City Mfg. Co. v. ILGW, Local No. 104."6 In this case a
labor union as an unincorporated association was contending that it
was a corporation under a constitutional provision identical to Wash-
ington's Article 12 § 5. The union argued that federal law gave it the
powers and privileges of a corporation not possessed by individuals and
partnerships in provisions pertaining to income taxes and anti-trust.
Although recognizing the power of the federal government to create
corporations, the court cited the following rule:
... we have no doubt at all that powers or privileges alleged to have
been conferred upon associations and organizations such as appellant by
two federal statutes in question should in any event be disregarded as
not sufficing to effect appellant's legal status under the constitution and
laws of this state. This in brief for the reason that the creation of a
corporation or suable entity is an exercise of sovereign legislative power
peculiar to the sovereignty which purports to exercise it, and having no
Massachusetts Trusts: "To possess or exercise powers or privileges of corporations
requires a sovereign grant, a franchise which said association has not and does not
profess to possess." The court concluded that the Massachusetts Trust could not give
itself the powers and privileges of a corporation, and therefore it was not affected by
the constitutional provision.
Even the supreme court of Kansas, from which comes a majority of the cases sup-
porting the Washington decisions (see note 30), admitted in Fitch v. United Royalty
Co., 143 Kan. 486, 55 P2d 409, 412 (1936) : "But just what powers a common law trust
does enjoy in Kansas which are not possessed by individuals and partnerships the court
has not had occasion to decide."
See also cases cited in note 31.
35 Such was the situation in the case of Keystone Bank v. Donnely, 19 Fed. 832 (E.D.
Pa. 1912). Pennsylvania, by statute, allowed the creation of so-called "partnership"
organizations which were allowed to carry on a banking business. The statute gave the
"partnership" several powers and privileges of corporations, including limited liability.
The court held that under a constitutional provision identical to Washington that the
"partnership" was an association having some powers and privileges of corporations
not possessed by individuals or partnerships, and therefore came within the constitu-
tional provision. Although the court then came to the questionable conclusion (as did
the Washington court in the Range case, supra) that the "partnership" -was a corpora-
tion within the meaning of Pennsylvania statutes as well as its constitution, the case
indicates the type of organization which validly comes within the constitutional pro-
vision.38 233 Mo. 935, 111 S.W.2d 934 (1938).
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extraterritorial effect except by permission of those other sovereignties
within whose limits the corporation so created may desire to carry on
its operations.37
Therefore, even if a foreign sovereign gave a Massachusetts Trust
powers and privileges of corporations, they would not be recognized
in Washington unless this state specifically recognized such powers by
statute. It is interesting to note that the statute giving foreign "corpora-
tions" powers and privileges in Washington88 applies only to companies
"incorporated" in other jurisdictions, and Washington law was the same
at the time the Range and Colvin cases were decided. 9 It is suggested
that this would not give a Massachusetts Trust any powers or privileges
of corporations in Washington.
In summary then, there was nothing in Washington law to give a
Massachusetts Trust powers and privileges of corporations, and the
Range and Colvin cases are therefore questionable. However, since the
time of these Washington decisions on the Massachusetts Trust, the
1959 Massachusetts Trust Act has given the Massachusetts Trust some
of the powers and privileges of corporations (such as limited liability),
and assuming that a Massachusetts Trust comes within the definition
of a joint stock company or an association, the provisions of Article 12
§ 5 of the Washington Constitution would apply now to the Massa-
chusetts Trust. This requires a fresh look at Massachusetts Trusts by
the Washington court.
The second criticism of the Range and Colvin cases is that they
conclude that the definition of the word "corporations" contained in
Article 12 § 5 of the Washington Constitution was meant to be a general
definition of the word for all purposes. The definition of "corporations"
in Article 12 § 5 is limited to that section by its own terms. Article 12
§ 5 is merely a definition of the word "corporations" as that term is
used in Article 12, and it states that the term as there used includes
all associations and joint stock companies "having any powers or privi-
leges of corporations not possessed by indivduals or partnerships." In
other words, the word "corporations" applies in Article 12 to incorpor-
ated companies and unincorporated organizations which have any
powers or privileges of incorporated companies. It is difficult to see
how a form of organization can "violate" a definition as is stated in
the Range case. A form of organization is either within or without the
371d. at 938.
3 8 RCW 23.52.
3D Wash. Sess. Laws 1890, ch. 9, §§ 1-3 at 288.
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term of a definition. It is also difficult to see how this definition "pre-
vents" the formation of unincorporated businesses which have any
powers or privileges of incorporated companies as is stated in the
Range case.
It is suggested that a proper interpretation of § 5 of Article 12 is
that certain unincorporated associations must comply with the pro-
visions of Article 12 which specially mention "corporations," but the
section does not preclude the formation of those unincorporporated
organizations. For example, such an unincorporated business must be
formed under general laws and not special acts (Article 12 § 1), and
it shall not issue stock except to bona fide subscribers, ot issue bonds
except for money or property received or labor done (Article 12 § 6),
etc. There is much authority for this interpretation in other jurisdic-
tions.40
It is also difficult to interpret Article 12 § 1 of the Washington Con-
stitution to mean that all businesses which are not individuals or part-
nerships must comply with general corporation laws as is argued by
the Department of Licenses. Article 12 § 1 says that "corporations"
(i.e., incorporated companies and unincorporated companies having
any powers or privileges of corporations) must be formed under general
laws and not special acts. This section does not say that all unincorpor-
ated companies having any powers or privileges of corporations must
organize under general corporation law, but merely that any law allow-
ing the formation of incorporated companies and such unincorporated
companies must apply generally to all and cannot be created by special
act.
The Washington Code has a different definition of a "corporation"
40 In Hodgkiss v. Northland Petroleum Consol., 104 Mont. 328, 67 P.2d 811, 816
(1937), the court said in construing a Montana constitutional provision identical to
Article 12 § 5 and criticizing the conclusion of the Washington court: "All of these
decisions overlook the fact that the constitutional provision by its own terms declares
that the word "corporation" shall have a certain meaning as applied to the article of
the Constitution in which it is found. Many courts from other jurisdictions having an
identical constitutional provision have noted this distinction and said that the provisions
of the constitution apply no further than the Article to which it refers."
In Brocki v. American Express Co., 279 F.2d 785, 786 (6th Cir. 1960), in construing
the Word "corporation" in the New York constitution, the court said: "This means no
more than that for the purposes stated in those sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article X, joint
stock companies are subject to the same regulations as corporations."
The court said in Attorney General v. McVichie, 138 Mich. 387, 101 N.W. 552, 553(1904), in holding that the definition of "corporations" did not extend beyond the con-
stitution: "Had the constitution makers so intended, they could easily have said so, and
the fact that the provision was limited to the term as used in the preceding section
indicates a contrary intention."
Other cases have also held that the constitutional definition of the word "corpora-
tions" was not meant to be a general definition. See cases cited at note 31.
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than the Washington Constitution. In the Code a "corporation" is
defined as an organization which is created under Chapter 23 RCW,4'
whereas a business trust comes within the definition of an "unincorpor-
ated association."42 At the time this definition was adopted the legis-
lature must have felt that the definition in Article 12 § 5 of the Consti-
tution was not intended to carry over to the statutes.
In referring to the Washington decision in the Range case that the
constitutional definition of the word "corporations" is a general one;
the Montana Supreme Court said in Hodgkiss v. Northland Petroleum
Consol.: 1
To say that because of this constitutional provision the trust here in-
volved becomes a corporation in one breath, and in the next to say that
it is not a corporation since it failed to comply with certain statutory
provisions is not logical to say the least.
A reading of Article 12 of the Washington Constitution in light of
today's situation without the benefit of past Washington judicial inter-
pretation which applied to a different situation, would indicate that
unincorporated companies having any powers or privileges of corpora-
tions can be formed in Washington as long as they comply with Ar-
ticle 12.
Thus it is suggested that the Massachusetts Trust Act of 1959 is
not in violation of the Washington Constitution, even if Massachusetts
Trusts are not required to comply with all general corporation statutory
laws.
It must now be seen if the Supreme Court of the State of Washington
will hold that the Massachusetts Trust is an invalid form of business
organization or whether the Court will hold Massachusetts Trusts to be
valid either by overruling prior Washington decisions, or by construing
them to allow Massachusetts Trusts, if such trusts comply with all
corporate statutory law. It is suggested that the proper decision would
be to overrule the prior decisions and to leave the determination of the
meaning "applicable" corporate laws either to the legislature or to later
decisions when specific problems arise.
STATE REGULATION
The next major problem the REIT will have to face in Washington if
the Massachusetts Trust Act of 1959 is held to be constitutional is the
41RCW 23.01.010 (1).42 RCW 23.01.010(14).
43104 Mont. 328, 67 P.2d 811 (1937).
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adoption of appropriate regulations by the Department of Licenses
or regulatory laws by the legislature governing the activities of the
REIT in Washington. There is little argument that some regulation is
necessary. If the REIT is a desirable form of business organization,
appropriate regulation should assist its growth by promoting investor
confidence. The question is whether these regulations should take the
form of full disclosure regulations such as those of the SEC and
those adopted by the State of New York," or regulations such as were
adopted by the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association" and
the California Department of Investments, Division of Corporations48
which regulate the manner in which the trust is administered. A
trustee who must steer the path laid down by the complex Internal
Revenue Code and Internal Revenue Service regulations, and regula-
tions such as those adopted in California, has no simple task.
The problem in adopting regulations is to adequately protect the
public without discouraging the formation of trusts, assuming that
the REIT is deemed a desirable form of business organization for
Washington. If the Massachusetts Trust Act of 1959 is held consti-
tutional, hearings will probably be held soon thereafter to consider
proposed regulations. The type of regulations which were adopted in
California will undoubtedly be considered since it is understood that
the proposals have been made to have the midwestern and western
states adopt uniform regulations." Those interested in REIT in Wash-
ington should familiarize themselves with those regulations in order to
determine whether their adoption would be desirable in Washington.
The California regulations place a straitjacket on the REIT, and
make it of questionable value as a form of business organization. The
most controversial provisions restrict the methods by which the pro-
moters of the trust can profit by its formation and restrict the type
of investments which the REIT can make.
In most cases the persons who promote the trusts will be those who
hope to operate the properties, or give investment advice to the trust,
or those who hope to make a commission from finding and transferring
assets to the trust. The investing public will be injured to the extent
that these persons are allowed to take unreasonable compensation for
their services from the trust. On the other hand, if these persons are
4 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352 c-j (McKinney Supp. 1962).
45 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 1111 4753-55.
46 10 CAL. Am. CODE §§ 549-52.
47 Los Angeles Mirror, July 11, 1961.
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restricted from taking reasonable compensation for their services, the
REIT will not be used and passive investors will not have an oppor-
tunity to avail themselves of the advantages of this form of investment.
An example of the type of restrictions found in the California regula-
tions is § 549.1(f) " which provides that contracts with independent
contractors "ordinarily" will have to be awarded by competitive bid-
ding to the lowest qualified bidder. Since in the usual situation those
who can perform services for the REIT will be the only ones interested
in going to the trouble of organizing them, this restriction would elimi-
nate most of the incentive of the promoters. Even if the fees charged by
the promoter are reasonable, another contractor could underbid the
promoter and take advantage of the promoter's work. Realizing this
inequity the regulations were amended by the addition of a provision
which allows the Commissioner to waive competitive bidding if he is
shown that a contractor is qualified and is charging reasonable rates.
The Commissioner's use of the discretion granted by the section will
determine how restrictive it will be in its operation.
Section 549.6(h) 9 of the California regulations carries the restric-
tions even further by providing that no assets of the trust may be
acquired directly or indirectly from or conveyed to any trustee,
employee, advisor of the trust or independent contractor with the
trust, nor may any such person receive any remuneration for such
acts. An exception to this rule provides that assets may be so trans-
ferred by such persons only upon formation of the trust or shortly
thereafter. This provision would reduce any interest a real estate sales-
man might have in promoting a trust, since any position of influence
which he might have with the trust would eliminate his ability to
receive even a reasonable commission for his services. The regulations
attempt to ameliorate this provision by allowing the Commissioner to
waive the regulation as to particular transactions, but the regulation
provides that such waivers should be rare.
Where fees and expenses may be paid, they are restricted. Section
549.7 0 provides that investment advisory contracts cannot provide for
a total annual compensation of more than 1% of the net assets of the
trust. Net assets are valued at cost less depreciation, or at market
value, whichever is less. This means that if a trust has $100,000.00
worth of assets at cost, the advisory fee cannot exceed $1,000.00.
48 10 CAL ADn. CODE § 549.1 (f).
49 10 CAL. ADm. CODE § 549.6(h).5o 10 CAL. ADm. CoDE § 549.7.
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Depreciation will reduce the amount of this fee over the years. It may
be difficult to find an investment advisor at these rates.5 The expenses
of the trustee, including salaries of all employees, printing, and other
miscellaneous expenses, are limited to $5,000.00 or 1 % or net assets,
whichever is greater. Excluded from the expenses covered by this
limitation are: depreciation, insurance, interest, taxes, maintenance
and upkeep of trust assets, payments to independent contractors, com-
pensation to investment advisors, reasonable sales commissions, and
reasonable appraisal fees." But even with these exclusions the expense
allowance does not appear reasonable.
The restrictions on types of investments which the real estate invest-
ment trust can make are also extensive. The trust may not invest more
than 10% of its assets in non-income producing real property, such as
vacant land, or property on which the principal permanent buildings
have not been completed.5" This last restriction may reduce an
important area of possible profit-making for the trust, since there
appears to be nothing under federal law which would prevent a trust
from constructing new buildings. 4 However, under the California
regulations not more than 10% of the trust's assets could be used
for such construction, since during the construction period the assets
being constructed would be non-income producing property, and an
investment in the type of property on which the improvements were
being constructed is severly restricted.
The restrictions on mortgage financing are also extensive. A REIT
cannot invest in property which has an encumbrance with an unpaid
balance exceeding two-thirds of the property's fair market value." In
addition the regulation provides that the aggregate unpaid balance of
all encumbrances to persons "tother than banks, insurance companies
or other institutional lenders" cannot exceed 10% of the fair market
value of the property. This provision would appear to eliminate pur-
chase money mortgages and purchases on real estate contract, and
require refinancing through institutional lenders of every property
purchased. The Statement of Policy of the Midwest Securities Com-
51The Statement of Policy of the Midwest Securities Commissioners, supra
note 45, allows investment advisors to receive annual compensation equal to one-half
of 1% of the net assets.
52 10 CAL. ADm. CODE § 549.8.
5310 CAL. Arm. CODE § 552 (a). The Statement of Policy of the Midwest Securities
Commissioners, supra note 45, allows only 5% of the trust assets to be invested
in non-income producing property.
54 N.Y.U. 20TH INsT. ON FED. TAx, 671 at 673 (1962).
55 10 CAL. Arm. CODE § 552(d).
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missioners" has a provision similar to the California regulation, except
that purchase money mortgages are expressly allowed. The exception
for purchase money mortgages has been eliminated from the California
version of the regulations.
The regulations also prohibit investment in real estate contracts 7
and mortgages except first mortgages on improved land where the
mortgage encumbrance does not exceed two-thirds of the value of the
property securing it."3 The trust cannot borrow, by way of unsecured
loans, more than 2 % of the net value of total assets."9
Also prohibited by the California regulations are the issuance of
more than one class of stock, 0 issuance of shares guaranteeing any
fixed return, " redeemable shares, " (thus eliminating open end trusts),
and warrants or options. 3
Any property acquired (other than government securities and cor-
porate securities listed on a national exckange6" and property used in
the operation of the trust) must be appraised by an independent con-
tractor satisfactory to the Commissioner, and property cannot be
purchased for more than such appraised value.
A REIT must have a net capital of not less than $100,000.00" and
non-corporate trustees must post a surety bond in an amount not less
than $100,000.00 or ten percent of the par or stated value of all shares
of stock, whichever is greater. 66 The bond need not exceed $500,-
000.00. Some have felt that this is a higher bond than is needed to
adequately protect the public.
The California regulations are more restrictive than the policy state-
50 Statement of Policy of Midwest Securities Commissioners, supra note 45, at
§ 14(e).
57 10 CAL. .AD. CODE § 552 (c).
Gs 10 CAr.. ADM. CODE § 552(b). Investment in mortgages other than the mortgages
allowed by this regulation may be made to the extent that such mortgages, plus any
investment in non-income producing property held by the trust does not exceed 10%
of the trust's assets. The Statement of Policy of the Midwest Securities Commis-
sioners allows the trust to invest in mortgages to the same extent as permitted by
savings and loan associations under local law.
GO 10 CAL. ADm. CODE § 552(e). The Statement of Policy of the Midwest Securities
Commissioners allows unsecured loans up to 8% of the value of the net assets of
the trust.Go 10 CAL. Am. CODE § 522(g).
61 10 CAL. Am. CODE § 522(h).
6210 CAL. ADm. CODE § 522(i).
63 10 CAL. Am. CODE § 522(o).
64This exception does not appear to include stocks listed on local exchanges, and
stocks traded over the counter. Such stock would have to be appraised and this would
seem to be a needless expense.
or 10 CAL. ADm. CODE § 549.5.
GO 10 CAL. Ams. CODE § 549.3.
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ment issued by the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association, of
which California is a member. The Midwest Statement of Policy has
no provision for competitive bidding for contracts with independent
contractors, no bonding requirements, allows a greater amount of
unsecured debt by the trust, allows a more lenient policy on investing
in mortgages and mortgage financing, and does not require appraisals
on purchases of assets other than real property."
It is the opinion of this writer that the adoption of regulations similar
to those adopted in California, taken together with the complexity of
the Internal Revenue Code and the Internal Revenue Service regula-
tions, would substantially discourage the formation of real estate
investment trusts in the State of Washington, especially since the
investment climate in Washington has not been as favorable as that
of California. It is submitted that the investor can be adequately
protected without regulations which reduce the already narrow path of
allowed activity for the REIT to a tight-rope.
One form of regulation which would protect the investing public
without discouraging the formation of trusts would be that which
required complete disclosure to the investor of all policies of the trust
which concerns matters covered by regulations such as those adopted
by California. Instead of the state administrative agency determining
what is good or bad for an individual investor, such regulations would
allow the investor to make this determination for himself by choosing
whether or not he wished to invest in such a trust, and would cause
sufficient information to be furnished him so that an intelligent decision
could be made. For example, instead of regulations which prohibit
the trust from investing in vacant land, the regulations would require
that the trust set out its policy on investment in vacant land. If the
trust should decide that in its particular circumstances a policy per-
mitting twenty-five percent of its assets to be invested in vacant land
would be appropriate, the investor would be notified of such a policy
and could then determine whether or not he wished to invest in such a
trust. In order to protect the investor from future changes the regula-
tions could provide that all matters upon which a policy declaration is
deemed desirable be embodied in the declaration of trust, and that
the declaration of trust could not be amended without at least a two-
67 Even where an appraisal is required by the Statement of Policy of the Midwest
Securities Association, supra note 45, it may be eliminated if the purchase price comes
within a formula provided for in § 13 of the Statement.
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thirds vote of the beneficiaries." The regulations would require that
the issuance of shares of the trust to investors be accompanied by a
prospectus and that the prospectus must state the trust's policies on
certain specified matters. This approach does not protect the investor
against himself, but does give the investor, either by himself or through
his investment advisor, the opportunity of knowing what he is purchas-
ing, and it gives the REIT maximum flexibility in formulating its own
policies.
SUMMAY
In the face of a complex federal code and Internal Revenue Service
regulations and possible restrictive regulations, and a not completely
clear state statute governing Massachusetts Trusts, only the brave
will venture into the form of business organization known as the Real
Estate Investment Trust. Against these complexities and unknowns,
these adventurers must weigh the value of the tax advantages provided
and the investor appeal it might generate.
If the Washington Supreme Court decides that the Massachusetts
Trust Act of 1959 is constitutional all problems will not be solved. If
the basis of the decision is that prior decisions were correct but held
the Massachusetts Trusts constitutional only if it follows all corporate
statutory law, the adventurer will have to decide how to apply a large
number of corporate laws that appear to be inapplicable to Massachu-
setts Trusts. If the court adopts the better rationale and overrules prior
decisions, the adventurer will still have to decide what is meant by
"applicable" corporate laws in the 1959 Act. A supreme court decision
which would resolve this dilemma would be most helpful.
If the Massachusetts Trust Act of 1959 is held constitutional, the
adventurer must be prepared to assist the Department of Licenses in
formulating regulations which will allow the REIT to operate effec-
tively in Washington.
68 The Statement of Policy of the Midwest Securities Association, supra note 45,
now contains a provision that the declaration of trust can only be changed by two-thirds
vote of the holders of the outstanding shares of beneficial interest.
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